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[ L . .A. No. 21826. In Bank. Mar. 3, 1952. J
CITY OF CULVER CITY et aL, Petitioners, v. SUPERIOR
COURT OF IjOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent.
[1] Injunctions-Performance and Enforcement of.-The institution of litigation, in which Culver City sought a determination
limiting its liability for the cost of a sewage disposal plant to
fixed sums already paid under prior contracts with the city of
Los .Angeles, was not compliance with an injunction requiring
payment of a proportionate share of the cost of a plant which
the city of Los .Angeles was ordered to construct, where the
rulings in the injunction proceeding preserved all rights under
the prior contracts but required them to be settled in other
proceedings.
[2] Contempt-Certiorari-Scope of Review.-.A judgment that
Culver City and members of its city council are guilty of
contempt for failure to pay its proportionate share of the
cost of a new sewage disposal plant will not be annulled in a
proceeding to review the judgment, where there is a substantial conflict in the evidence with respect to the city's
claim that it has done everything it can to comply with the
injunction.
[3] !d.-Judgment or Order-Specification of Act.-To comply
with the requirement of Code Civ. Proc., § 1219, that when
a person is to be imprisoned for contempt until he performs
a certain act "the act must be specified in the warrant of commitment," such act must be specified with particularity.
[4] !d.-Judgment or Order-Recitals.-Judgment that councilmev of Culver City be imprisoned for contempt until they
have completed all arrangements necessary for financing the
city's proportionate share of the cost of a new sewage disposal
plant according to the gallonage allotted to the city, and
that they tall:e such action (1) by appropriation of necessary
funds or levying of a tax or other charge, or (2) by any other
system, method or plan, or (3) by the doing of such things
as might be necessary for the sale of bonds to provide the
necessary funds, is not too vague a description of the act
which the contemnors must do to purge themselves of contempt, and insofar as the specification permits alternative
methods of compliance, it is to their benefit rather than
detriment.
[3] See Cal.Jur., Contempt, § 46; Am.Jur., Contempt, § 78.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Injunctions, § 90.5; [2] Contempt,
§ 80; [3] Contempt, § 58; [ 4, 5] Contempt, § 59; [ 6, 7] Contempt,
§ 37.
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[5] Id.- Judgment or Order- Recitals.- ]'ailure of judgment
committing Culver City councilmen for contempt to specify
the precise sums to be paid as the
proportionate share
of the cost of a new sewage dispJsal plant and the dates on
which they are to be paid is not a fatal defect where there
is a precise formula for computing such share, based on
gallonage allotted to the city and the total capacity of the
plant, and the cost of the plant and the times when the funds
are required can be determined by consultation with the city
of Los Angeles, the builder of the new facilities.
[6] !d.-Nature of Proceeding.-Contempt proceeding against city
and members of its city council for failure to perform acts
required by an injunction is not fatally defective for failure
to advise them whether the proceeding is for criminal or civil
contempt or both, since in California the proceedings leading
to punishment for failure to obey a decree (criminal contempt)
and to imprisonment until the omitted act is performed
(civil contempt) are exactly the same. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§§ 1209-1219.)
[7] Id.- Nature of Proceedings.- Although Code Civ. Proc.,
§§ 1209-1219, which provide the procedure for both criminal
and civil contempt are in part III of that code, which is
entitled "Special Proceedings of a Civil Nature," contempt
proceedings are said to be "criminal in nature" and those
procedural rights and safeguards which are appropriate to
criminal contempt proceedings are also afforded, in California,
in civil contempt proceedings.

PROCEEDING to review a judgment of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County holding petitioners in contempt of
court. Affirmed.
E. L. Searle for Petitioners.
Fred N. Howser and Edmund G. Brown, Attorneys General, and Bayard Rhone, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
SCHAUER, J.-Petitioners, Culver City and the members
of its city council, seek review and annulment of a judgment
that they are guilty of contempt for failure to perform acts
required by the injunction in People v. City of Los Angeles
(1948), 83 Cal.App.2d 627 [189 P.2d 489]. The relevant
portions of the injunction and the factual situation which
led to its issuance are described in the opinion in City of
[7] See Cal.Jur., Contempt, § 37; Am.Jur., Contempt, § 67.
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Vernon v. Superior Court, ante, p. 509 [241 P.2d 243].
We have concluded that the contempt judgment should be
affirmed.
The contempt proceeding was commenced by the filing of
an affidavit which contained the following allegations: Petitioners have personal knowledge of the terms of the judgment
and the requirements imposed by it on Culver City. The
judgment became final on November 12, 1948, after affirmance on petitioners' appeal and denial of their petition for
certiorari. Culver City intends to dispose of its sewage
through the new plant built by Los Angeles. Since 1945 Los
Angeles has attempted ''to work out an arrangement'' with
Culver City by which the latter could pay its proportionate
share of the cost of the new plant, but Culver City has refused to do so. On February 14, 1949, the city council authorized institution of an action against Los Angeles to obtain judicial interpretation of agreements with Los Angeles,
made in 1922 and 1925, which concern disposition of sewage.
On April 11, 1950, the city council submitted to the electors
of Culver City a proposed bond issue of $1,250,000 to pay
for sewage facilities, and the issue was approved by more
than two thirds of the electors. Petitioners have done nothing
more to comply with the injunction, although they have the
ability to comply.
The reason for Culver City's failure to obtain money for
its share of the cost of the new plant by selling its bonds
appears from an answering affidavit of petitioners and from
the testimony at the contempt hearing. The city cannot sell
the bonds, it is asserted, because it cannot obtain the opinion
of a bond attorney that they are marketable. The bonds
''must be, in the opinion of counsel [the bond attorney],
valid and binding obligations of the issuing city before a
marketable opinion can be issued.'' The bond attorney will
not give a marketable opinion because he is not certain that
there is a legal obligation of Culver City to Los Angeles
which would be a basis for issuance and sale of the bonds.
It appears from the evidence that the bond attorney would
give a marketable opinion (1) if Culver City would enter
into a contract to pay Los Angeles its share of the cost ·of
the new plant pursuant to sections 55110 and 55112 of the
Government Code, which provide for ''an agreement with
other local agencies for the joint construction, ownership, or
nse of sewage treatment plants" and for a bond issue to pay
the cost of such construction, or (2) if, in the declaratory
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relief action of Culver City against Los Angeles which was
authorized by the city council and which is now pending,
it is determined that Culver City owes Los Angeles a sum
certain on account of sewage disposal. Culver City urges
that it has done and is doing, in good faith, everything it
can to bring about a situation in which the bond attorney
would give a marketable opinion.
The evidence as to why Culver City and Los Angeles
have not entered into a contract pursuant to sections 55110
and 55112 of the Government Code is conflicting. There is
testimony of individual petitioners that representatives of
Los Angeles refused to enter into a new contract unless
petitioners abandoned their claims under the 1922 and 1925
contracts. 1 This testimony was not directly denied, but a
representative of Los Angeles testified that he told the council of Culver City that "we were not arguing or deciding
the merits of the old contracts; Culver City certainly had
the right to determine that in court whenever they saw fit
to do so.,, 'l'his latter statement is obviously in accord with
the rights of the parties as adjudicated in the injunction
decree.
[1] In its declaratory relief action against Los Angeles,
Culver City takes the position that its 1922 and 1925 contracts with Los Angeles obligate Los Angeles to dispose of
all sewage of Culver City for fixed sums which have already
been paid, and that Culver City cannot be required to pay
Los Angeles further sums to aid in defraying the cost of
a new sewage plant. Argument that the pendency of the
declaratory relief action in any way shows a bona fide attempt to comply with the injunction decree is but a reiteration
in a different form of the contention made by Vern on in relation to its contracts with Los Angeles. As in the Vernon
case it is to be remembered that the basic suit (see p. 648
of 83 Cal. A pp.2d) "is a proceeding initiated by the . . . State
of California . . . to abate a public nuisance. Therefore,
the court rightfully refrained from passing upon any of the
rights, obligations or liabilities affecting the various defendants by reason of their contractual relations with each
1

Los Angeles had no right to impose such a condition. As the District Court of Appeal stated in its opinion on appeal from the injunction
decree, ''Insofar as the judgment herein is concerned, if any of the appellants [including Culver City] have any rights against the city of Los
Angeles, or vice versa, by 1·eason of any existing contract, such rights
have been preserved and may be enforced in a proper action.'' (People
v. City of Los Angeles (1948), supra, 83 Cal.App.2d 627, 648.)
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other.'' The statement in the opinion of the District Court of
Appeal that "Insofar as the judgment herein is concerned,
if any of the appellants [including Culver City] have any
rights against the city of Los Angeles, or vice versa, by reason of any existing contract, such rights have been preserved
and may be enforced in a proper action,'' does not mean that
Culver City, or any other of the injunction defendants, may
escape complying with the terms of the judgment by instituting further litigation. On the contrary, as declared in Vernon (ante, p. 519 [241 P .2d 243]), this ruling preserves
to petitioners all contractual rights they may possess under
the mentioned contracts but likewise it requires them to settle or litigate those rights independently of compliance with
the injunction decree. Culver City's continued reliance on
its 1922 and 1925 contracts with Los Angeles is, in effect,
a refusal to abandon contentions which were made and decided against it in the injunction suit. As in Vern on (ante,
p. 519 [241 P.2d 243] ), the judgment in the basic suit and
the decision of the District Court of Appeal conclusively
establish that the bringing of actions upon the old contracts
is not compliance with the injunction and that such litigaton remains open for determination on its merits, unaffected
by the injunction decree. (Norris v. Ban Mateo County Title
Co. (1951), 37 Cal.2d 269, 272 [231 P.2d 493].)
[2] To negate Culver City's claim that it has done everything it can do to raise money to pay for its share of the
cost of the new plant, respondent also relies upon evidence
that other cities were able to make arrangements with Los
Angeles whereby they issued marketable bonds and upon the
admitted failure of Culver City to attempt to raise funds
by tax or assessment. All that can be said in favor of petitioners in respect to the evidence of their asserted good faith
attempts to comply with the injunction is that there is a substantial conflict. Since the conflict is substantial and has
been resolved against petitioners by the trial court, the judgment cannot on that ground be annulled.
Petitioners also present arguments as to the uncertainty
of the injunction and the charge of contempt which are
answered in the opinion in City of Vernon v. Superior Court,
ante, pp. 513-515 [241 P .2d 243]. They make another contention which arises out of the same uncertainty as that which,
it is claimed, inheres in the injunction. [3] It is urged
that the commitments (quoted 1:nfra) of certain citees are
void because they do not comply with section 1219 of the
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Code of Civil Procedure. That section provides, "When
the contempt consists in the omission to perform an act which
is yet in the power of the person to perform, he may be
impriRoned until he have performed it, and in that case the
act rmtst be specified in the warrant of commitment." Italics
added.) The act must be specified with particularity. (In
re Wells (1946), 29 Cal.2d 200, 202 [173 P.2d 811]; In re
Vallindras (1950), 35 Cal.2d 594, 596 [220 P.2d 1].)
[4] Certain individual citees here are committed "until
they and all of them have completed all arrangements necessary for the financing of the proportionate share of the city
of Culver City of said new treatment plant or works, according to the gallonage allotted to the city of Culver City,
and so that said share will be available as required; that they
take such action (1) by the appropriation of the necessary
funds as stated in said judgment or the levying of a tax,
charge, assessment, imposing fee~, tolls, rentals or other
charges for the raising of the necessary funds, or (2) by any
other system, method, plan or device, or combination thereof,
or ( 3) the doing of such things as might be necessary for
the sale of said bonds and the sale of said bonds to provide
the means by which said municipal corporation could or might
raise, accumulate or collect the moneys necessary for the payment of said city's proportionate share of the cost of construction of the new treatment plant and submarine outfall
at Hyperion, so that its share might he available as required.''
It is urged that the foregoing is too vague a description of
the act which the citees must do to purge themselves of contempt. Insofar as the specification permits alternative methods
of compliance, it is to the benefit, rather than the detriment,
of the petitioners. [5] Nor is the omission to specify the
precise sums to he paid and the dates on which they are to
be paid a fatal defect. As in the Vernon case, there is a precise formula for computing the share of the cost, based upon
gallonage allotted to the city (a figure which the petitioner
city itself can specify) and the total capacity of the plant
(a known figure), and the cost of the plant and the times
when the funds are required can be determined by consultation with Los Angeles, which has proceeded with the construction of the plant despite the failure of some of the other
parties to the injunction suit to comply with the injunction.
As also pointed out in the Vernon opinion, the trial court
in the basic injunction decree expressly reserved jurisdic-
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tion to supervise and settle any disputes which might arise
in respect to fixing petitioners' share of the costs.
[6] Petitioners argue at some length concerning the distinction between civil and criminal contempt. From the beginning of this proceeding petitioners have urged that they
should be advised whether the proceeding was for criminal
contempt, civil contempt, or both, and that the proceeding
is fatally defective because the two types of contempt were
''scrambled.'' They say, vaguely, that they have been deprived of constitutional rights because they were not informed
whether the contempt proceeding had as its object the punishment of petitioners or the enforcement of the injunction, but
they suggest no respect in which the failure to so inform
them affected them adversely or at all. The distinction .between civil and criminal contempt is important in the federal and some state courts because there are procedural differences, particularly in the safeguards afforded the citee,
and also, perhaps, differences in the nature of the intent
which must be shown. (See, e.g., Gompers v. Buck's Stove
& R. Co. (1911), 221 U.S. 418, 441, 444 et seq. [31 S.Ct. 492,
55 L.Ed 797]; Garrigan v. United States (1908), 163 F. 16,
19, 22 [89 C.C.A. 494, 23 L.R.A.N.S. 1295], cert. denied, 214
U.S. 514 [29 S.Ct. 696, 53 L.Ed. 1063] ; Bigelow v. RKO Radio
Pictures (1948), 78 F.Supp. 250, 254; State v. Fletcher Tr.
Co. (1937), 211 Ind. 27, 32, 34 [ 5 N.E.2d 538] ; Root v. MacDonald (1926), 260 Mass. 344, 364 [157 N.E. 684, 54 A.L.R.
1422]; see, also, Joseph Moskovitz, Contempt of Injunctions
( 1943), 43 Columb.L.Rev. 780; Comment ( 1950), 48 Mich.
hRev. 860.) But in California the proceedings leading to
punishment for failure to obey a decree (criminal contempt)
and to imprisonment until the omitted act is performed (civil
contempt) are exactly the same. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 12091219; see In re MoTris (1924), 194 Cal. 63, 67 [227 P. 914] .)
[7] Although the sections which provide the procedure for
both kinds of contempt are in Part III of the Code of Civil Proerdure, which is entitled "Special Proceedings of a Civil
Nature,'' contempt proceedings are said to be ''criminal in
nature'' and those procedural rights and safeguards which
are appropriate to criminal contempt proceedings are also
afforded, in Californa, in civil contempt proceedings. (See
5 Cal.Jur., Contempt, § 37.) Therefore, as in Chas. Cushman
Co. v. Mackesy (1938), 135 Me. 490, 494 [200 A. 505, 118
A.L.R. 148], "the distinction is not of importance, for the
procedure in both cases, in so far as equity decrees are con-
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cerned, is governed by the statutory provisions above mentioned.''
Arguments as to the undue severity of punishment of the
individual petitioners are answered in City of Vernon v.
Superior Court, ante, p. 520 [241 P.2d 243].
:B-,or the reasons above stated the judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Traynor, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J.
pro tem., concurred.
EDMONDS, J.-For the reasons stated in my concurring
and dissenting opinion in City of Vernon v. Superior Court,
ante, p. 520 [241 P.2d 243], I concur in the conclusion that
the petitioners were guilty of contempt because they did not
comply with the injunction within the time specified.
However, the belated ''arrangements'' made by the petitioners to comply with the injunction are even more thorough
than the action taken by the city of Vernon. Culver City
has attempted, unsuccessfully, to sell bonds to meet its share
of the cost of the new plant. Counsel for Culver City will
not give an opinion as to marketability until its liability is
determined in a pending declaratory relief action which it
has brought against the city of Los Angeles. In the alternative,
such an opinion probably could be secured if Culver City
would contract with Los Angeles for payment of its share of
the cost of the Hyperion plant. But the terms of such contract
also are dependent upon the existing contractual rights of
the parties. Thus, Culver City has reached an impasse in its
efforts to comply with the injunction.
For these reasons, in my opinion, Culver City has made
all ''arrangements'' necessary to meet its obligations without
abandoning its rights under existing contracts which are
specifically preserved by the judgment in the abatement proceeding.
I would, therefore, modify the judgment by striking therefrom the order of continuing imprisonment for petitioners
Thomas J. Carroll, Curtis J. Davis and J. Ray Klots.
CARTER, J.-I dissent for the same reasons as are set
forth in my dissenting opinion in City of Vernon v. Superior
Court, ante, p. 522 [241 P.2d 243], this day filed.
'l'he opinion was modified to read as above printed and petitioners' application for a rehearing was denied April 2, 1952.
Carter, J., was of the opinion that the application should be
granted.
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[L. A. No. 22152.

In Bank.
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KENNETH W. HALL et al., Respondents, v. WILLIAM
COYLE et al., Defendants; CLYDE TRUSS, Appellant.
ll] Judgments- Res Judicata- Proof.- Parol evidence or reporter's transcript is admissible to show what matters provable
under issues of case were submitted in former action as basis
for determining whether judgment therein is res judicata.
[2] Id. -Res Judicata- Identity of Causes of Action.- Where
plaintiffs' house was destroyed by fire when defendants' agent
was transferring butane gas to plaintiffs' containers, a judgment of nonsuit in action based on alleged obligation of
defendants to pay money in accordance with an agreement
compromising a claim for damages for such destruction due
to the negligent conduct of defendants is not a bar to subsequent tort action seeking a recovery on the very claim itself.
[3] Compromise and Settlement-Claims Compromisable.-Rights
under an agreement compromising a claim are not dependent
on the validity of the claim itself.
[4) Judgments-Res Judicata-Waiver and EstoppeL-Where defendant's attorney, in action on contract, expressly stated
in his motion for a nonsuit that the action was one on
the alleged contract, and both the trial judge and opposing counsel entertained a similar belief, defendant may not,
in a subsequent tort action brought against him by the same
plaintiff, reverse his position and declare that the issue of
negligence was also involved in the first action.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San
Diego County. L. N. Turrentine, Judge. Affirmed.
Action for damages for destruction of house and its contents
by fire due to defendants' negligence. Judgment for plaintiffs
affirmed.
Raymond F. Feist and Henry F. Walker for Appellant.
Charles B. Provence and Brooks Crabtree for Respondents.
[3] See Cal.Jur., Compromise and Settlement, § 7; Am.Jur.,
Compromise and Settlement, § 5.
[4] See Cal.Jur., Judgments, § 233; Am.Jur., Judgments, § 207.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Judgments, § 445; [2] Judgments,
§357(2); [3] Compromise and Settlement, §3; [4] Judgments,
§ 449.

